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RECENT DECISIONS
This section is divided into two parts: notes and abstracts. The abstracts consist merely
of summaries of the facts and holdings of recent cases and are distinguished from the notes
by the absence of discussion.

NOTES
CoNSTlTUTIONAL LAW - LABOR UNIONS - INJUNCTION - Complainants owned and operated a small cafeteria conducting the business without the
aid of any employees. Defendants, a labor union and its president, picketed the
cafeteria in an attempt "to organize it." The picketing was carried on by
parade of one person at a time in front of the premises, at all times in an
"orderly and peaceful" manner. Signs were carried which t~nded to give the
impression that the complainants were "unfair" to organized labor and that the
pickets "had been previously employed in the cafeteria." These representations
were knowingly false in that there had been no employees in the cafeteria and
the complainants were "not unfair to organized labor." It further appeared
as a fact that the pickets told prospective customers that the cafeteria served bad
food and that by "patronizing" it "they were aiding the cause of Fascism." The
complainants sought an in junction against such picketing and the state courts,
from the trial court through to the court of last resort, enjoined the defendants.
On certiorari the case was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States
to determine whether the state court had "exceeded the bounds within which
the Fourteenth Amendment confines state power." Held, the· injunction should
be dissolved. Cafeteria Em'j!loyees Union, Local 302, et al v. Angelos et al,
(Nov., 1943) 64 S. Ct. 126.
.
The conclusion seems to have been based upon the ground that the action
of the state court amounted to a denial of free speech guaranteed, so far as state
action is concerned, by the Fourteenth Amendment. This must be the law, for
the highest court in the land without dissent says that it is. However, if that be
true, then the law is even worse than what Bumble said it was.
FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCEs-UNIFORM AcT-TEST OF ''FAIR CoNsIDERATION" -Writ of entry. Plaintiff claimed under an execution sale, defendant under a deed from the judgment debtor: Plaintiff charged that defendant's deed was void by virtue of the provision of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act dealing with transfers by an insolvent debtor "without a fair
consideration." 1 The debtor had been a tenant in common of the premises with

c:

1 Mass. Gen. Laws ( 193 z),
109A, §
1932), c. 109A, § 4, provides in part:

also found in Laws Ann. (Michie,
.
"Every conveyance made ._ •• by a person who is or will be thereby rendered
insolvent is fraudulent as to ,creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made ... without fair consideration."'
Sec. 3 provides:
"Fair consideration is given for property or obligation-(a) When in exchange
for such prop~rty or obligation, /IS a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property
4,
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his brother and the defendant, his mother. In satisfaction of ah indebtedness of
$3,000 he conveyed to defendant his undivided interest of the agreed value of
$4,000. The trial court found that the conveyance was made in good faith
"for a fair consideration which was an antecedent debt not disproportionately
small as compared with the value of the property obtained by her." Affirmed.
The trial court erred in applying the definition of "fair consideration" in the
second clause of section 3 of the Uniform Act relating to security transactions
instead of the definition in the first clause dealing with exchange transactions,
but the evidence supported the finding of good faith and of fair consideration.
Bianco v. Lay, (Mass. 1943) 48 N.E. (2d) 36.
It was sensible to ignore the trial court's error in substituting the 3b formula,
"not disproportionately small" for the 3a formula, "fair equivalent." These
phrases are both so vague (because of the nature of these problems they are
necessarily so vague) that there is no demonstrable difference between them.
This is not to say that the same standard of judgment is to be employed in both
cases, but the distinction arises not from differing phraseology of the two sections of the statute but from factual differences between the two types of
transfer.
On the one hand, security transactions ought to involve and normally do
involve an excess of property over debt, called "margin of security." The desirable percentage of margin will vary with the nature of the property (fluctuating or non-fluctuating, liquid or non-liquid, etc.) but under no conditions can a
security be thought good unless the value of the property exceeds the debt by a
fair margin. These practices and these attitudes are bottomed on the fact that
excess value in the security transaction is not value placed beyond the reach of the
debtor. He may recapture the excess by redemption or in other ways. Neither is .
the excess value placed beyond the reach of the debtor's creditors, who by process
of some kind can reach his "equity" in the property without the aid of fraud law.
It follows that there is no occasion to think of a security transaction as fraudulent
unless and until the excess of security becomes so great that it cannot be justified
even from the point of view of the secured creditor.2
Conditions are quite different in the case of the exchange transactions
which are the subject of section 3a. Here, by hypothesis, the transferror keeps no
strings on his property by way of a right of redemption. If, then, his property
is worth more than the consideration he receives, he says good-bye to this excess
of value forthwith, and if this excess is as great as the margin which is normal
to a security transaction, the deal is necessarily a hard bargain for the transferror. Furthermore, if this hard bargain stands (if it is not impeached for
fraud) the excess value is put entirely beyond the reach of creditors. It is not,
as in the case of the security transaction, an "equity" remaining in the debtor
and hence remaining within the reach of his creditors.
is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (b) When such property or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount
not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property or obligation obtained."
2 We are here concerned with constructive fraud spelled out of inadequate consideration. There are, of course, frauds of other kinds, e.g. fictitious securities for
fictitious debts.
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It follows that in the gamut of cases with which the U nifonn Act is concerned the threshold of fraud is reached much sooner in exchange transactions
than it is in security transactions. The single phrase "fair consideration" can be
applied to both situations, but it must be applied with a difference. Presumably
the draftsmen of the act meant to indicate this difference in the phrases employed in section 3 to define "fair consideration," viz. for exchange transactions
the phrase "fair equivalent" ·and for security transactions the phrase "not disproportionately small." But the draftsmen faced this difficulty, that in each
category there is a potpourri of cases varying in kind as well as in degree. For
instance, in security transactions reasonable margin depends upon many factors,
including the stability of the property ( values fluctuating much or little) and its
liquidity ( market more or less organized, more or less active) and including
also the personal responsibility of the debtor. Therefore to fix the meaning of
"fair consideration" by a mathematical ratio of dollar values ( whether 2 :r or
3 :r or whatever) would be intolerable. Likewise in the case of exchange
transactions, the fairness of a bargain depends upon other factors than mathematical ratio of values. For instance, though it may be supposed that few would
quarrel with the decision in the principal case, holding satisfaction ·of a debt of
$3,000 to be fair consideration ~or an undivided interest in land of the "agreed
value" of $4,000, reaction would have been quite different if the property had
been highly liquid-for example, if it had been General Motors common stock
having on the market 'of the day a value of $4,000. Again, consider the case of
payment of a debt in cash. Such a payment is a "conveyance" within the meaning of the Uniform Act ( see definition in section I) and it is governed by the
same definition of fair consideration that governed the principal case. That is
to say, the same verbal formula, "fair equivalent" is applicable. But it is difficult to ,imagine the- Massachusetts court holding payment of $4,000 cash in
satisfaction of a $3,900 debt to be a conveyance for fair consideration.3
The upshot is that when the draftsmen of the Uniform Act split the cases
into two groups, security transactions and exchange transactions, they hardly
advanced at all toward a mathematical formula of fair consideration. They
were still forced to use terms so vague that ( we repe"at) there is no demonstrable difference between them. It may be granted that the phrase "fair
equivalent" connotes a closer approach to mathematical equality than does the
phrase "not disproportionately small," but the difference is like that between
strong and weak adjectives. It is too vague to affect the decision of cases. 4 So
3 In the principal cases the court was not content to think of the problem in
terms of a debt of $3,000 and property worth $4,000, but at p. 41 gave thought to
the character of the property:
" •.. we think that the judge . , . could properly take cognizance of the limited
market for such undivided interests in land, the rights of cotenants to convey their
particular interests to another or others and to force sales or divisions in partition proceedings, and the consequent possibility of not realizing the values placed upon them
by the owners."
4 Buhl v. McDowell, 51 S.D. 603 at 606, 216 N.W. 346 ( 1927) dealing with
an exchange transfer: " ... a fair consideration ~eans one not disproportionate to the
value of the property conveyed. In other words, it must be a fairly adequate consideration." In a similar case, Detroit and Security Trust Co. v. Gitre, 254 Mich. 66,

1944

J

RECENT DECISIONS

it is clear that if the Massachusetts court had reversed this decision because the
wrong formula had been applied it would have been a miscarriage of justice.
And, contemplating the vicissitudes of this case both in the trial court and in the
appellate court, one cannot but question the wisdom of attempting, in the Uniform Act, to formulate a distinction betweeen the two types of conveyance.
Might it not have been better to avoid all semblance of exactness by lumping
conveyances of every kind in one bracket and applying to them something like
the pharmacist's elastic phrase, quantum sufficit?

E.N.D.

235 N.W. 884 (1931), (conveyances to wife and son for services performed) the
Michigan court employed the "disproportionately small" test. The latter case is
frowned upon by Professor McLaughlin who apparently sees a significant difference
between the two phrases; McLaughlin, "The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act," 46
HARV. L. REV. 404 at 411 (1933). While not in sympathy with him on this point,
we concur in his condemnation of cases which substitute "valuable consideration" for
the statutory language. "Valuable consideration" is a technical term in contract law and notoriously includes the peppercorn.

